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INTRODUCTION 
 
When the Michigan Medical Marijuana Act1 went into effect on December 4, 2008, 
Michigan became the thirteenth state to legalize medical marijuana.2  The Michigan Medical 
Marijuana Act provides a complete defense to the prohibition against use and possession of 
marijuana.3  It permits, through the Michigan Medical Marijuana Program, qualifying patients4 
to utilize up to two and one half ounces of marijuana and up to twelve marijuana plants kept in a 
closed, locked facility for medicinal/therapeutic purposes so long as the qualifying patient suffers 
from a debilitating medical condition,5 secures physician written approval prior to use,6 and 
registers with the Michigan Department of Community Health securing a registry identity card 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 M.C.L. §§ 333.26422-30 (2008).  As yet, there is no constitutional right to possess a controlled substance. See 
People v. Ovalle, 222 Mich. App. 463, 467 (1997).  Laws prohibiting the possession, use, and sale of marijuana do 
not violate the rights to privacy, equal protection, or due process. People v. Alexander, 56 Mich. App. 400, 402 
(1974).  The State of Michigan has the power to pass laws against the sale and use of marijuana, and persons 
arrested for the sale or possession of marijuana can be prosecuted. People v. Sinclair, 387 Mich. 91, 103 (1972). 
2 The laws of Alaska, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Maine, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Vermont, 
Rhode Island, and Washington do not penalize the medical use and cultivation of marijuana. M.C.L. § 333.26422 
(2008).  Michigan joined in this effort for the health and welfare of its citizens. M.C.L. §§ 333.26422-30 (2008).  
During the creation of this Note, New Jersey became the fourteenth state to legalize medical marijuana on January 
2010. See 2008 N.J. Sess. Laws page no. 117; New Jersey Compassionate Use Medical Marijuana Act, Department 
of Health and Senior Services Homepage, available at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2008/Bills/S0500/119_R3.PDF.  
Additionally, the Arizona Medical Marijuana Initiative is headed for the November 2010 ballot. Arizona Medical 
Marijuana Act, 2010 Initiatives, Referendums, and Recalls, Arizona Secretary of State.gov, available at 
http://www.azsos.gov/election/2010/general/ballotmeasuretext/I-03-2010.pdf. 
3 M.C.L. §§ 333.26421-30 (2008).   
4 M.C.L. § 333.26424(1)-(3) (2008).   
5 Patients must suffer from a debilitating medical condition, defined as: 
 
(1) Cancer, glaucoma, positive status for human immunodeficiency virus, acquired immune 
deficiency syndrome, hepatitis C, amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, Crohn's disease, agitation of 
Alzheimer's disease, nail patella, or the treatment of these conditions. 
(2)  A chronic or debilitating disease or medical condition or its treatment that produces 1 of more 
of the following: cachexia or wasting syndrome; severe and chronic pain; severe nausea; seizures, 
including but not limited to those caused by epilepsy; or severe or persistent muscle spasms, 
including but not limited to those which are characteristic of multiple sclerosis. 
(3) Any other medical condition or treatment for a medical condition approved by the department, 
as provided by section 5(a).  See M.C.L. 333.26423(a)(1)-(3) (2008).   
 
6 A patient must secure a document from a Michigan licensed physician who has established a patient/physician 
relationship with the patient stating that in the physician’s professional opinion patient is likely to receive 
therapeutic or palliative benefit from the medical use of marijuana to treat patients debilitating medical condition.  
See M.C.L. § 333.26423 (2008); see also General Information about the Program, Department of Community 
Health Homepage, available at http://www.michigan.gov/mdch/0,1607,7-132-27417_51869_52137---,00.html. 
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subject to annual renewal.7  The program also permits a qualifying care provider to utilize the 
defense so long as the care provider’s acts were in furtherance of the patient’s legal medicinal 
use of the drug.8   
The Michigan Medical Marijuana Act and the Michigan Medical Marijuana Program do 
not directly address whether the statute applies retroactively to pending or prior drug 
convictions.9  California was the first state to legalize medicinal use of marijuana.10  Thus far, 
California is the only state that retroactively applied its medical marijuana laws to cases pending 
on direct appeal when the California Compassionate Use Act of 1996 was enacted.11  Prior to the 
enactment of the Michigan Medical Marijuana Act, the other eleven medical marijuana states12 
did not follow California’s approach and generally applied their respective statutes prospectively 
to cases pending on direct appeal.13   
At least three state circuit courts have ruled that the Michigan Medical Marijuana Act 
should be applied retroactively.14  The defendants in those cases were allowed to raise the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Ballot Proposal 08-01, House Fiscal Agency Homepage, available at 
http://house.michigan.gov/hfa/PDFs/Medical%20Marijuana%20Ballot%20Proposal%20of%202008.pdf (last visited 
March 31, 2010).  There are three elements to the complete defense provided by Michigan’s Medical Marijuana Act.  
See M.C.L. §§ 333.26421-30 (2008).  The patient must secure a physician statement from a licensed physician. See 
M.C.L. § 333.26424(b) (2008); see also M.C.L. § 333.26428(a)(1) (2008).  Next, the quantity of marijuana must be 
reasonably necessary for treatment. See M.C.L. § 333.26424(b)(1) (2008); see also M.C.L. § 333.26428(a)(2) 
(2008).  Finally, the contested conduct must have been undertaken to treat a patient’s medical condition.  See M.C.L. 
§ 333.26424(a) (2008); see also M.C.L. § 333.26428(a)(1) (2008).   
8 M.C.L. § 333.26428(a)(2) (2008).   
9 M.C.L. §§ 333.26423-30 (2008).   
10 See Compassionate Use Act of 1996, Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11362.5 (West Supp. 2003); People v. Trippet, 
66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 559, 562, 566-67, 570-71 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).  
11 Id. 
12 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.  
13 See infra note 180; Trippet, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 559, 562, 566-67, 570-71; Preston v. State Bd. of Equalization, 25 
Cal. 4th 197 (2001); U.S. Home Corp. v. Zimmerman Stucco and Plaster, Inc., 749 N.W.2d 98 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2008); Comprehensive Petroleum Underground Storage Tank Fund Bd. v. Shell Oil Co., 606 N.W.2d 370 (Iowa 
2000); In re Marriage of Vannausdle, 668 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 2003); Ubel v. State, 547 N.W.2d 366 (Minn. 1996); 
Richtmyer v. Richtmyer, 461 A.2d 409 (R.I. 1983); State v. Bolin, 381 S.C. 557 (Ct. App. 2009); see also Michael 
M. O’ Hear, Statutory Interpretation and Direct Democracy: Lessons from the Drug Treatment Initiatives, 40 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 281(Summer 2003). 
14 See People v. Peterson, Alger County Circuit Court Case No. 09-1854-FH.  James Peterson was charged with 
manufacturing of marijuana after police seized two marijuana plants from his Alger County home on November 3, 
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Michigan Medical Marijuana Act as a complete defense, even though they had not yet received 
medical marijuana registry cards.15  All these cases involved situations where the defendant had 
a serious medical condition, would qualify for a registry card, and had a case pending on direct 
appeal when the law went into effect on December 4, 2008.16  None of these cases involved sale 
or delivery of marijuana.17   
Several other trial courts have refused to allow retroactive application of the Michigan 
Medical Marijuana Act to cases pending on direct appeal.18  At this time, at least one court held 
that if a defendant was convicted under a valid statute prior to the Michigan Medical Marijuana 
Act’s enactment, he or she is not entitled to appellate relief.19  Thus, it is likely that this issue will 
ultimately be decided by the higher courts.20   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2008, one day before the Michigan Medical Marijuana Act was passed by popular vote.  Id.  Circuit Court granted 
Peterson’s motion to dismiss asserting the Michigan Medical Marijuana Act could apply retroactively.  Id.  The 
Circuit Court held that “[p]ublic policy would certainly suggest that if a medical benefit can be realized from the use 
of a particular substance, what possible harm can be found by the state in allowing the same to be applied 
retroactively?” Id.  See also People v. Burke, 775 N.W.2d 800 (Mich. 2009) (remanding issue of retroactive 
application of the Michigan Medical Marijuana Act); People v. Campbell, 778 N.W.2d 239 (Mich. 2010) (holding 
that retroactive application of the Michigan Medical Marijuana Act should not be reviewed by the Michigan 
Supreme Court at this time); People v. Malik, Barry County, COA Case NO 293397; People v. King, Shiawassee 
County Circuit Court Case No. 09-8600-FH; People v. Vanderbutts, Cass County Circuit Court Case No. 09-08600-
FH.  Some courts applied the statute prospectively.  See People v. Peters, 2010 WL 199604 (Mich. App. 2010) 
(holding that the Michigan Medical Marijuana Act applied prospectively because the statute contained no express 
language of retroactivity); In the Matter of Keven Joseph Markle v. Green, 2009 WL 2951127 (Mich. App. 2009) 
(holding that the Michigan Medical Marijuana Act did not apply retroactively to respondent’s appeal because his use 
of  marijuana predated the enactment of the MMMA, and there was never any suggestion that respondent’s use of 
marijuana was linked to any health problems or medicinal purposes). 
15 See Burke, 775 N.W.2d at 800-12; Campbell, 778 N.W.2d at 239-45; People v. Malik, Barry County, COA Case 
NO 293397 (holding that the Michigan Medical Marijuana Act shall apply retroactively to pending criminal 
appeals).  
16 See Burke, 775 N.W.2d at 800-14; Campbell, 778 N.W.2d at 239-46(holding that retroactive application of the 
Michigan Medical Marijuana Act should not reviewed by the Michigan Supreme Court at this time).   
17 See Burke, 775 N.W.2d at 800-12; Campbell, 778 N.W.2d at 239-45; People v. Malik, Barry County, COA Case 
NO 293397. 
18 See supra note 14; see also People v. Adams, 2009 WL 4144577 (Mich. App. 2009); See People v. Peters, 2010 
WL 199604 (Mich. App. 2010); In the Matter of Keven Joseph Markle v. Green 2009 WL 2951127 (Mich. App. 
2010).   
19 See Adams, 2009 WL 4144577 *1-6 (holding that the Medical Marijuana Act was effective after defendant’s 
conviction);  M.C.L. §§ 333.26421-30 (2008). 
20 Though, it is unlikely this question will be resolved by the Michigan Supreme Court later this year because the 
Court has, thus far, rendered such appeals without merit for review. See People v. Burke, 775 N.W.2d 800 (Mich. 
2009); People v. Campbell, 778 N.W.2d 239 (Mich. 2010).  An answer may be more forthcoming in the lower 
appellate courts. See Adams, 2009 WL 4144577 *1-6; see also M.C.L. §§ 333.26421-30 (2008).  
4	  
	  
This Comment, in Part I, explains the efforts of various states to legalize medical 
marijuana use.  It describes the Michigan Medical Marijuana Act and the Michigan Medical 
Marijuana Program.  It further describes prospective and retroactive application of Michigan 
laws focusing primarily on criminal drug laws.  It then contrasts California’s retroactive 
application of its medical marijuana laws to pending cases on direct appeal to Michigan’s 
presumption of prospective application of new substantive criminal laws to pending cases on 
direct appeal.  Part II confronts the arguments, made by some courts and some commentators, 
that the Michigan Medical Marijuana Act should not be applied retroactively to cases pending on 
direct appeal when the law was enacted on December 4, 2008.  Part II argues that the Michigan 
Medical Marijuana Act is a new substantive law that contains no express or implied indications 
of retroactivity.  New substantive laws that contain no express or implied language of 
retroactivity are applied prospectively to cases on direct appeal in Michigan.  California’s 
retroactive approach is not applicable in Michigan.  Retroactive application would be contrary to 
public policy by furthering individual over societal interests and condoning illegality.  Part II 
also analyzes case law and the relevant background information discussed in Part I and argues 
that legislatures should be careful and meticulous in drafting their medical marijuana statutes to 
ensure that their statutes are prospectively or retroactively applied in accordance with legislative 
intent.  Part II concludes with drafting suggestions for future medical marijuana acts.   
I. AN OVERVIEW OF RETROACTIVE AND PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION OF MEDICINAL 
MARIJUANA LEGISLATION AND THE MICHIGAN MEDICAL MARIJUANA Act 
 
Although federal law currently prohibits any use of marijuana except under very limited 
circumstances, states are not required to enforce federal law or prosecute people for engaging in 
5	  
	  
activities prohibited by federal law.21  The laws of Alaska, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Maine, 
Montana, New Jersey, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Vermont, Rhode Island, and Washington 
do not penalize the medical use and cultivation of marijuana.22  Michigan joined this effort in 
2008.23   
Thus far, California is the only state to retroactively apply its medical marijuana 
legislation to cases pending on direct appeal when the California Compassionate Use Act of 
1996 was enacted.24  But, California has subsequently limited retroactive application to those 
instances where a patient with a debilitating disease procures a doctor’s prescription prior to 
using and possessing medical marijuana.25  As yet, it is unclear whether Michigan will follow 
suit or even expand this doctrine.26   
A. The History of Medical Marijuana Legalization Efforts 
The medical community has long recognized the therapeutic value of marijuana.27  The 
drug was not seriously regulated until the passage of the Marijuana Tax Act of 1937.28  The 
statute fined recreational users one hundred dollars an ounce, effectively pricing recreational 
users out of the legal market, and placed an exception taxing medical marijuana users only one 
dollar an ounce.29  It was not until President Nixon’s War on Drugs of the early 1970’s, that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 See United States v. Cannabis Cultivators Club, 532 U.S. 483 (2001); M.C.L. §§ 333.26422-30 (2008); M. 
Wesley Clark, Can State Medical Marijuana Statutes Survive the Sovereign’s Federal Drug Laws? A Toke Too Far, 
35 U. BALT. L. REV. 1, 1-6 (Fall 2005).   
22 M.C.L. § 333 26422 (2008). 
23 See M.C.L. §§ 333.26423-30 (2008). 
24 See supra note 13; Compassionate Use Act of 1996, Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11362.5 (West Supp. 2003); see 
also People v. Trippet, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 559, 562, 566-67, 570-71 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998). 
25 People v. Wright, 40 Cal. 4th 81, 91 (2006); People v. Rigo, 69 Cal. App. 4th 409 (1st Dist. 1999). 
26 See People v. Burke, 775 N.W.2d 800 (Mich. 2009); People v. Campbell, 778 N.W.2d 239 (Mich. 2010); People 
v. Malik, Barry County, COA Case NO 293397.   
27 Marijuana was included in United States Pharmacopeia until 1948.  See LESTER GRINSPOON & JAMES B. 
BAKALAR, MARIJUANA, THE FORBIDDEN MEDICINE 4-8 (1997) (describing the medical uses of marijuana prior to 
the passage of the passage of the Controlled Substances Act).   
28 See Pub. L. No. 75-238, § 7(a)(1)-(2), 50 Stat. 551-54, repealed by Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and 
Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 1101, 84 Stat. 1236, 1292.  
29 Id. 
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Congress completely banned medicinal and recreational use of marijuana with the passage of the 
Controlled Substances Act, listing the drug as a Schedule I drug after concluding it featured a 
high potential for abuse.30  
Regardless of this blanket prohibition, the Food and Drug Administration approved 
therapeutic research programs under the Food and Drug Act’s Investigational New Drug 
Program.31  With these research efforts, acceptance of the drug by the medical and scientific 
communities resurfaced.32  These efforts culminated with California passing the California 
Compassionate Use Act of 199633 (“Compassionate Use Act”) effectively ceding enforcement of 
all medical marijuana related activity, including growth and distribution, to the federal 
government.34  In effect, the Compassionate Use Act legalized medicinal use and individual 
growth of the drug in California, but federal enforcement remained.35   
The purpose of the Compassionate Use Act was “[t]o ensure that seriously ill 
Californians have the right to obtain and use marijuana for medical purposes.”36  The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Pub. L. No. 91-513, tit. II, 84 Stat. 1236, 1242-84 (1970) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-904 
(2000)); see also Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 9 (2005). 
31 See Nat’l Org. for the Reform of Marijuana Laws v. DEA, 559 F.2d 735, 741-45 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Nicole 
Dogwill, Comment, The Burning Question: How Will the United States Deal with the Medical- 
Marijuana Debate?, MICH. ST. L. REV. 247, 256-67 (1998).  
32 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(5)(A)-(B) (2000); Nat’l Org. for the Reform of Marijuana Laws, 559 F.2d at 741-45; Nat’l 
Org. for the Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Ingersoll, 497 F.2d 654, 654-56 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Michael Isikoff, 
Administrative Law Judge Urges Medicinal Use of Marijuana, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 
1988, at A2; Marijuana Scheduling Petition, 54 Fed. Reg. 53, 767 (Dec. 29, 1989); Alliance for Cannabis 
Therapeutics v. DEA, 15 F.3d 1131, 1137 (D.C. Cir. 1994).  
33 Compassionate Use Act of 1996, Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11362.5 (West Supp. 2003).  In November 1996, 
California voters passed Proposition 215, known as the Compassionate Use Act of 1996, by a 56% majority, 
becoming the first state to legalize the drug for medicinal purposes. Cal. Health & Safety Code, §11362.5(b)-(d) 
(West Supp. 1998). 
34 See id.; see also Richard Lacayo, Marijuana: Where There's Smoke, There's Fire, TIME, Oct. 28, 1996, at 36 
(discussing the controversies surrounding the passage of the Compassionate Use Act).   
35 United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 190 F.3d 1109, 1114 (9th Cir. 1999) (per curiam), rev'd, 532 
U.S. 483 (2001). 
36 Cal. Health & Safety Code §11362.5(A) (West Supp. 1998).  Another purpose of the Compassionate Use Act 
described in the Preamble was “to encourage the federal and state governments to implement a plan to provide for 
the safe and affordable distribution of marijuana to all patients in medical need of marijuana.” Id.  Compare Cal. 
Health & Safety Code § 11362.5(A) (West Supp. 1998) (“To ensure that seriously ill Californians have the right to 
obtain and use marijuana for medical purposes where that medical use is deemed appropriate and has been 
7	  
	  
Compassionate Use Act limits possession and use of marijuana for the treatment of cancer, 
anorexia, AIDS, chronic pain, spasticity, glaucoma, arthritis, migraine, or any other illness for 
which marijuana provides relief.”37  To this end, the Compassionate Use Act’s substantive 
provisions state that Section 11357, relating to the possession of marijuana, and Section 11358, 
relating to the cultivation of marijuana, “shall not apply to a patient, or to a patient’s primary 
caregiver, who possesses or cultivates marijuana for the personal medical purposes of the patient 
upon the written or oral recommendation or approval of a physician.”38  The Compassionate Use 
Act contains no language of retroactivity nor does it construe the limit of marijuana, measured 
either in the number of marijuana plants or ounces of marijuana, that an individual patient or 
caregiver may possess.39   
The federal government’s response to the passage of the Compassionate Use Act was 
two-fold.40  Neither effort effectively challenged the act’s implementation.41  First, the federal 
government sought to enjoin cultivation and distribution by California marijuana dispensaries.42  
Defendants asserted the medical necessity defense in those cases.43  The Supreme Court held that 
the medical necessity defense was not a valid defense for the manufacture and distribution of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
recommended by a physician who has determined that the person’s health would benefit from the use of marijuana 
in the treatment of cancer, anorexia, AIDS, chronic pain, spasticity, glaucoma, arthritis, migraine, or any other 
illness for which marijuana provides relief.”) & Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11362.5 (West Supp. 1998) (The 
Compassionate Use Act’s “purpose is ‘[t]o ensure that seriously ill Californians have the right to obtain and use 
marijuana for medical purposes upon the recommendation of a physician.”) with M.C.L. § 333.26422 (2008)  
(“Modern medical research, as found by the National Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Medicine in a March 1999 
report, has discovered beneficial uses for marijuana in treating or alleviating the pain, nausea, and other symptoms 
associated with a variety of debilitating medical conditions.”).   
37 Cal. Health & Safety Code §11362.5(A) (West Supp. 1998). 
38 Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11362.5(d) (West Supp. 1998). 
39 See Id. People v. Tilehkooh 113 Cal. App. 4th 1433, 1436 (2003); see also Cal. Health & Safety Code § 
113.627(c) (West Supp. 1998). 
40 See Administration Response to Arizona Proposition 200 and California Proposition 215, 62 Fed. Reg. 6164, 
6164-70 (Feb. 11, 1997). 
41 See United States v. Cannabis Cultivators Club, 532 U.S. 483 (2001); United States v. Cannabis Cultivators Club, 
5 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1092 (N.D. Cal. 1998).  
42 Cannabis Cultivators Club, 532 U.S. at 483-90; Cannabis Cultivators Club, 5 F. Supp. 2d 1086-1092; Linda 
Greenhouse, Justices Set Back Use of Marijuana to Treat Sickness, N.Y. Times, May 15, 2001, at A1.   
43 Cannabis Cultivators Club, 532 U.S. at 483-90; Cannabis Cultivators Club, 5 F. Supp. 2d 1086-1092. 
8	  
	  
marijuana by the dispensaries because the Compassionate Use Act left no doubt that the defense 
was unavailable.44  Regardless of these few cases, distribution continued relatively 
unhampered.45   
Next, the federal government sought to punish prescribing doctors.46  In response, 
California doctors sought an injunction.47  Thereafter, the Ninth Circuit permanently enjoined the 
federal government from revoking their licenses where the basis is solely upon recommendation 
of medical use of marijuana under the First Amendment.48  Recognizing the successes after the 
enactment of the Compassionate Use Act and the federal government’s limited enforcement 
efforts, eleven states49 enacted medical marijuana laws.50  Most recently, Michigan passed the 
Michigan Medical Marijuana Act in December 2008.51   
California’s Compassionate Use Act provided a statutory template for many states.52 
Michigan gleaned many of the provisions and definitions within the Michigan Medical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Cannabis Cultivators Club, 532 U.S. at 483-89.  
45 See supra note 42. 
46 See Cannabis Cultivators Club, 5 F. Supp. at 1086, 1092. 
47 See id. 
48 See id. 
49 Although federal law currently prohibits any use of marijuana except under very limited circumstances, states are 
not required to enforce federal law or to prosecute people for engaging in activities prohibited by federal law. 
M.C.L. §§ 333.26422-30 (2008); Ballot Proposal 08-01, House Fiscal Agency Homepage, available at 
http://house.michigan.gov/hfa/PDFs/Medical%20Marijuana%20Ballot%20Proposal%20of%202008.pdf (last visited 
March 31, 2010).  The laws of Alaska, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Maine, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, 
Oregon, Vermont, Rhode Island, and Washington do not penalize the medical use and cultivation of marijuana.  
Michigan joins in this effort for the health and welfare of its citizens. M.C.L. §§ 333.26422-30 (2008). 
50 See M.C.L. §§ 333.26423-30 (2008); Ballot Proposal 08-01, House Fiscal Agency Homepage, available at 
http://house.michigan.gov/hfa/PDFs/Medical%20Marijuana%20Ballot%20 Proposal%20of%202008.pdf (last 
visited March 31, 2010); Cal. Health & Safety Code §11362.5 (West Supp. 1998).  
51 See M.C.L. § 333.26424 (2008); see also About the MMMP, Department of Community Health Homepage, 
http://www.michigan.gov/mdch/0,1607,7-132-27417_51869_52136---,00.html.  New Jersey followed suit shortly 
after in January 2010. 2008 N.J. Sess. Laws page no. 117; New Jersey Compassionate Use Medical Marijuana Act, 
Department of Health and Senior Services Homepage, available at 
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2008/Bills/S0500/119_R3.PDF.  The Arizona Medical Marijuana Initiative is headed 
for the November 2010 ballot. Arizona Medical Marijuana Act, 2010 Initiatives, Referendums, and Recalls, Arizona 
Secretary of State.gov, available at http://www.azsos.gov/election/2010/general/ ballotmeasuretext/I-03-2010.pdf. 
52 Compare Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11362.5(d) (West Supp. 1998) (The Compassionate Use Act relieves a 
defendant of criminal liability for certain marijuana-related offenses if the defendant possesses or cultivates 
marijuana for his “personal medical purposes. . . upon. . .approval of a physician.”) with M.C.L. §§ 333.26428(a)(1) 
(2008) (“A physician has stated that, in the physician's professional opinion, after having completed a full 
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Marijuana Act from the Compassionate Use Act directly.53  This is especially apparent in the 
Preamble of the Michigan Medical Marijuana Act.54   
B. The Michigan Medical Marijuana Act and the Michigan Medical Marijuana Program      
The Michigan Medical Marijuana Act was created by ballot initiative as a result of a 
petition drive sponsored by the Michigan Coalition for Compassionate Care.55  The initiative was 
submitted to both houses of the Michigan Legislature on March 200856 and was approved by the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
assessment of the patient’s medical history and current medical condition made in the course of a bona fide 
physician-patient relationship, the patient is likely to receive therapeutic or palliative benefit from the medical use of 
marijuana to treat or alleviate the patient’s serious or debilitating medical condition or symptoms of the patient’s 
serious or debilitating medical condition”).  See also Ronald Timothy Fletcher, The Medical Necessity Defense and 
De Minimis Protection for Patients who would Benefit from Using Marijuana for Medical Purposes: A Proposal to 
Establish Comprehensive Protection under Federal Drug Laws, 37 VAL. U. L. REV., 983, 1022 (Summer 2003).  
All the medical marijuana states have modeled their legalizing statutes after California’s Compassionate Use Act, 
but California’s retroactive application of its medical marijuana statute is not typical. See Marijuana Policy Project, 
State-By-State Medical Marijuana Laws: How to Remove the Threat of Arrest, MMP.ogr, available at http:// 
www.mpp.org/assets/pdfs/general/ SBSR_ 2007.pdf ; see also People v Rossi, 18 Cal. 3d 295, 299-30 (1978); 
People v. Rigo, 69 Cal. App. 4th 409, 415 (1st Dist. 1999); People ex rel. Lungren v. Peron, 59 Cal. App. 4th 1383, 
1389 (1st Dist. 1997); People v. Wright, 40 Cal. 4th 81, 98 (2006).  No different rule applies to an affirmative 
defense to the crime for which a defendant was convicted, which defense was enacted during the pendency of her 
appeal. People v Trippet, 56 Cal App. 4th 1532, 1538-39, 1544-45 (1997).  In a majority of states, a statute or 
amendment will be regarded as operating prospectively where it is in derogation of a common law right, or where 
the effect of giving it a retroactive operation would be to interfere with an existing contract, destroy a vested right, 
or create a new liability in connection with a past transaction. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. U.S. ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 
939 (1997); Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Mancusi, 632 So. 2d 1352 (Fla. 1994); Langston v. Riffe, 359 Md. 396 
(2000); Frank W. Lynch & Co. v. Flex Technologies, Inc., 463 Mich. 578 (2001); Smith v. Mercer, 276 N.C. 329 
(1970). 
53 Compare M.C.L. §§ 333.26422-30 (2008) (providing a defense where marijuana use is for the treatment of 
“cancer, anorexia, AIDS, chronic pain, spasticity, glaucoma, arthritis, migraine, or any other illness for which 
marijuana provides relief”) with Cal. Health & Safety Code §11362.5 (West Supp. 1998) (providing a defense where 
“the patient is likely to receive therapeutic or palliative benefit from the medical use of marijuana to treat or alleviate 
the patient's serious or debilitating medical condition or symptoms[, including cancer, glaucoma, HIV, chronic 
pain].”).  
54 Compare Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11362.5 (b)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1998) (asserting that “[s]ubject to the 
requirements of this article, the individuals specified in subdivision (b) shall not be subject, on that sole basis, to 
criminal liability under Section 11357, 11358, 11359, 11360, 11366, 11366.5, or 11570. However, nothing in this 
section shall authorize the individual to smoke or otherwise consume marijuana unless otherwise authorized by this 
article, nor shall anything in this section authorize any individual or group to cultivate or distribute marijuana for 
profit.”) with M.C.L. §§ 333.26428(a)-(b) (2008) (“Except as provided in section 7, a patient and a patient's primary 
caregiver, if any, may assert the medical purpose for using marijuana as a defense to any prosecution involving 
marijuana, and this defense shall be presumed valid where the evidence shows [compliance with the substantive 
terms of this act].”). 
55 See M.C.L. §§ 333.26423-30 (2008); Ballot Proposal 08-01, House Fiscal Agency Homepage, available at 
http://house.michigan.gov/hfa/PDFs/Medical%20Marijuana %20Ballot%20Proposal%20of%202008.pdf  (last 
visited March 31, 2010).   
56 Id. 
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voters on November 2008.57  So long as the substantive and procedural requirements are met,58 
the law provides an affirmative defense for qualifying patients with debilitating medical 
conditions and their registered primary caregivers from arrest, prosecution, and penalty for the 
medical use of marijuana in accordance with the act.59   
The Michigan Medical Marijuana Program (“MMMP”)60 was established to administer 
the registration program required by the Michigan Medical Marijuana Act.61  The MMMP is not 
a resource for the growing process or the procurement of cultivated marijuana.62   It will not give 
physician referrals to patients.63  There is no place in the state of Michigan to legally purchase 
medical marijuana.64   
Only a person with a qualifying debilitating medical condition who has obtained a valid 
MMMP card is exempt from the criminal laws of Michigan for engaging in the medical use of 
marijuana as justified to mitigate the symptoms or effects of the person’s debilitating medical 
condition.65  The act neither protects marijuana plants from seizure nor individuals from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 See M.C.L. §§ 333.26420-30 (2008).   
58 The Michigan Medical Marijuana Program permits qualifying patients to utilize 2.5 ounces of marijuana and up to 
twelve marijuana plants kept in a closed, locked facility for medicinal/therapeutic purposes so long as the qualifying 
patient suffers from a debilitating medical condition, secures physician approval prior to use, and registers with the 
Michigan Department of Community Health securing a registry identity card subject to annual renewal.  M.C.L. §§ 
333.26421-30 (2008).   
59 General Information about the Program, Department of Community Health Homepage, available at 
http://www.michigan.gov/mdch/0,1607,7-132-27417_51869_52137---,00.html; Ballot Proposal 08-01, House Fiscal 
Agency Homepage, available at http://house.michigan.gov/hfa/PDFs/Medical%20Marijuana%20Ballot%20Proposal 
%20of%202008.pdf  (last visited March 31, 2010).   
60 The Michigan Medical Marijuana Program is a state registry program within the Bureau of Health Professions of 
the Michigan Department of Community Health.  Id. The MMMP’s primary purpose is assure that the registration 
process is conducted efficiently and effectively, consistent with all statutes and administrative rules pertaining to the 
MMMP, and to ensure that the statutory tenants of the act are carried out in a manner that protects the public and 
assures the confidentiality of its participants.  Id.  
61 M.C.L. §§ 333.26421-30 (2008).   
62 See General Information about the Program, supra note 59.    
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Presuming a patient is registered with the state patient registry and carrying his or her registry identification card, 
patient may consume medical marijuana on patient’s property or elsewhere. M.C.L. § 333.26427 (2008).  However, 
the law does not permit any person to do any of the following: 
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prosecution if the federal government chooses to take action against patients or caregivers under 
the Controlled Substances Act.66   
The MMMP enforces the registration process making sure applications are complete 
before issuing a registry identification card, terminating incomplete or fraudulent applications, 
and revoking cards if individuals commit violations of the Michigan Medical Marijuana Act.67  
The MMMP verifies the validity of a registration card with local and state law enforcement 
personnel if they call the MMMP requesting such information.68  The MMMP has no authority to 
direct the activities of local and state law enforcement agencies.69  Nowhere in the Michigan 
Medical Marijuana Act or the Michigan Medical Marijuana Program is retroactive application 
referenced or discussed.70  The Michigan Medical Marijuana Act contains no express effective 
date in the text.71  But, the Constitution provides an effective date of December 4, 2008, and the 
Michigan Medical Marijuana Act’s enforcement provision references that date as well in a 
footnote.72 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
     (1) Undertake any task under the influence of marijuana, when doing so would constitute  
       negligence or professional malpractice. 
 (2) Possess marijuana, or otherwise engage in the medical use of marijuana: 
  (A) in a school bus; 
   (B) on the grounds of any preschool or primary or secondary school; or 
  (C) in any correctional facility. 
 (3) Smoke marijuana: 
   (A) on any form of public transportation; or 
  (B) in any public place. 
 (4) Operate, navigate, or be in actual physical control of any motor vehicle, aircraft, or motorboat      
       while under the influence of marijuana.  M.C.L. § 333.26427(b)(1)-(4) (2008). 
 
66 See supra notes 21, 40-51 and accompanying text.    
67 See General Information about the Program, supra note 59.    
68 Id.  
69 Id.  
70 M.C.L. §§ 333.26421-30 (2008).   
71 Id. 
72 MICH. CONST. art. II, § 9 (1963); M.C.L. §§ 333.26429 (2008) (Compiler’s note states “2008, Initiated Law 1, Eff. 
Dec. 4, 2008”); See Frank W. Lynch & Co. v. Flex Technologies, 463 Mich. 578, 580-86 (2001); People v. Conyer, 
281 Mich. App. 526, 529 (2008).  
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C. California’s Presumption of Retroactive Application of Legalizing Statutes to Pending Cases 
on Direct Appeal 
 
California courts recognize a presumption of retroactive application of newly enacted 
decriminalizing statutes to cases pending on direct appeal and have extended this presumption to 
the Compassionate Use Act.73  People v. Rossi involved a defendant who was convicted of 
violating the California Penal Code for filming various illegal sexual acts.74  During her appeal, 
the Legislature amended Section 288(a) of the California Penal Code to decriminalize the acts 
performed in the film.75  Relying on In re Estrada76 which held that a superseding reduction in 
the punishment accorded a particular violation could be applied retroactively, the California 
Supreme Court had no difficulty applying that principle to the slightly different facts before it.77  
Thus, the California Supreme Court held that the common law principles reiterated in Estrada 
apply a fortiarari when criminal sanctions have been completely repealed before a criminal 
conviction becomes final.78  Absent a saving clause, a criminal defendant is entitled to the 
benefit of a change in the law during the pendency of his or her appeal.79  Because Proposition 
215 contains no savings clause, it was held to operate retrospectively to defend against criminal 
liability, in whole or part, for some who are appealing convictions for possessing, cultivating, 
and using marijuana.80   
Applying this principle, the Court of Appeal, Division II, in Trippet, held that the 
Compassionate Use Act, which contained no contrary indicia or savings clause, applied 
retroactively to defendant’s medical necessity defense if its terms and the applicable facts of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 See People v. Rossi, 18 Cal. 3d 295, 299-302 (1976). 
74 Id.  
75 Id.  
76 63 Cal. 2d 740, 48 (1965). 
77 Rossi, 18 Cal. 3d at 295, 299-302. 
78 Id. at 295, 299-302.  
79 People v. Rossi, 18 Cal. 3d 295, 299-302 (1976). 
80 Id.   
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case permitted the defendant to assert a common law medical necessity defense.81  Thus, not 
only does the California legislation affect future marijuana cases, but it allows any person with a 
pending marijuana conviction on direct appeal to invoke the act as a partial or complete 
affirmative defense on direct appeal.82  The court concluded, and the California Attorney General 
conceded, that absent wording to the contrary, the legislature should be presumed to have 
extended to defendants whose appeals are pending on direct appeal, the benefits of intervening 
statutory amendments which decriminalize formerly illicit conduct or reduce the punishment for 
acts which remain unlawful.83  
Relying on Trippet, the Third Appellate District in People v. Frazier limited retroactive 
application of the Compassionate Use Act to cases pending on direct appeal further.84  The Third 
Appellate District held that because the new affirmative defenses to defendant’s marijuana 
conviction are not available to him, retroactive application is not appropriate because a 
retroactive defense is only required if its terms and the applicable facts permit a defense to 
defendant.85   
The Supreme Court of California in People v. Wright86 essentially agreed with the 
analysis set forth in Trippet and Frazier and concluded that the Compassionate Use Act must be 
retroactively applied to cases pending on direct appeal.87  The inquiry did not end there because 
the defendant was still required to establish that the facts and terms of the act apply to the case, 
effectively prohibiting prescriptions by licensed physicians after a patient is convicted of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 See People v Trippet, 56 Cal. App. 4th 1532, 1538-39, 1544-45, 1568-69 (1997).  Trippet concerned a woman 
who alleged her use of marijuana was for the treatment for her migraines. Id.  She sought retroactive application of 
the statute to her pending appeal. Id.   
82 Id. at 1567. 
83 Id. at 1532, 1538-39, 1544-45, 1567.   
84 People v Frazier, 128 Cal. App. 4th 807, 825-826 (2005) (citing Trippet, 56 Cal. App. 4th at 1532, 1544-45).  
85 Frazier, 128 Cal. App. 4th at 807, 825-26. 
86 40 Cal. 4th 81, 91 (2006).   
87 Id. (citing People v Trippet, 56 Cal. App. 4th 1532, 1544-45 (1997); Frazier, 128 Cal. App. 4th at 807, 825-26). 
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unlawful use or possession of marijuana without a prescription.88  Thus, retroactivity was 
effectively narrowed.89  Medical approval via issuance of a prescription for the drug after arrest 
was prohibited on direct appeal in California under the Compassionate Use Act.90 
D. Retroactive and Prospective Application of Michigan Criminal Laws to Pending Cases on 
Direct Appeal 
 
Michigan’s general rule of retroactivity asserts that a substantive criminal statute is 
presumed to operate prospectively unless there is either an express or implied indication by the 
drafters that the statute is to have retroactive effect.91  However, an exception to this general rule 
is recognized if a statute is remedial, procedural, or curative in nature.”92  Considerations of 
fairness may require retroactive application of a statute.93   
A statute is remedial if it is designed to correct an existing oversight in the law or redress 
an existing grievance, or if it operates in furtherance of an existing remedy and does not create or 
destroy existing rights.94  Procedural laws pertain to and prescribe the practice and procedure or 
the legal machinery by which the substantive law is determined or made effective.95  Curative 
laws correct defects subsequently discovered in a statute and restores what Congress had always 
believed the law to be.” 96  Michigan extends fairness considerations generally to new principles 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 Wright, 40 Cal. 4th at 91. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 See Frank W Lynch & Co v Flex Technologies, 463 Mich. 578, 585 (2001); People v. Conyer, 281 Mich. App. 
526, 529 (2008) (holding that a statute that “affects or creates substantive legal rights…is not given retroactive 
effect, absent a clear indication of legislative intent otherwise”).  California courts recognize a presumption of 
retroactive application of newly enacted decriminalizing statutes to cases pending on direct appeal and have 
extended this presumption to the Compassionate Use Act. See People v. Rossi, 18 Cal. 3d 295, 299-302 (1976). 
92 See Lynch, 463 Mich. at 578-85. 
93 See Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 478 (1993); People v. Houlihan, 474 Mich. 958 (2005). 
94 See Lynch, 463 Mich. at 578-585; Conyer, 281 Mich. App. at 526-29. 
95 See id.   
96 See also People v. Link, 225 Mich. App. 211, 214-18 (1997); Preston v. Dep’t of Treasury, 190 Mich. App. 491, 
495-96 (1991). 
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of law to cases pending in civil court97 or to new watershed rules of criminal procedure to cases 
in habeas court under Teague v. Lane.98 
The Michigan Supreme Court held that in determining whether a statute is to be applied 
retrospectively, most instructive is whether the Legislature includes express language regarding 
retroactivity.99  The Legislature has shown on several occasions that it knows how to make clear 
its intention that a statute apply retroactively.100  Retroactive application has been stated in 
former legislation: “this act shall be applied retroactively,”101 “this subsection shall be given 
retroactive application,”102 and “[t]he changes in liability that are provided for in the amendatory 
act that added this subsection shall be given retroactive application.”103   
In the absence of express language of retroactivity, the Michigan Supreme Court held that 
retroactivity may be implied where there are no penalties in the statute for failure to comply with 
the terms of the statute.104  If the statute lacks an express effective date, the statute is generally 
given prospective application.105  The effect that retroactive application will have on overall 
judicial efficiency is also to be considered in determining whether a statute requires retroactive 
or prospective application.106  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 See Michigan Educ. Employees Mut. Ins. Co. v. Morris, 460 Mich. 180 (1999).   Where the decision does reflect a 
new principle of law, the Michigan Supreme Court has acknowledged that  resolution of the retrospective-
prospective issue ultimately turns on considerations of fairness and public policy, and has employed a three-part test 
to determine to what extent, if any, a decision should receive retroactive application. Id. Under this test, the Court 
weighs (1) the purpose to be served by the new rule, (2) the extent of reliance on the old rule, and (3) the effect of 
retroactivity on the administration of justice. Id. at 190. 
98 Teague v. Lane held that retroactivity is properly treated as a threshold question, for, once a new constitutional 
rule of criminal procedure is applied to the defendant in the case announcing the rule, evenhanded justice requires 
that it be applied retroactively to all who are similarly situated. 489 U.S. 288 (1989). 
99 In determining whether a statute should apply retroactively, the intent of the Legislature and the language within 
the statute govern. Chesapeake & O. R. Co. v. Public Service Comm., 382 Mich. 8, 22-23 (1969) 
100 M.C.L. § 141.1157 (2008). 
101 Id. 
102 M.C.L. § 324.21301(a)(2) (2008).  
103 M.C.L. § 324.21301(a) (2008). 
104 See Frank W Lynch & Co v Flex Technologies, 463 Mich. 578, 585 (2001); see also People v. Conyer, 281 
Mich. App. 526, 529 (2008). 
105 Id.  
106 See also Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); Parshay v. Dept. of Corr., 61 Mich. App. 677 (1975). 
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II. THE MICHIGAN MEDICAL MARIJUANA ACT DOES NOT APPLY RETROACTIVELY TO 
PENDING CASES ON DIRECT APPEAL BECAUSE THERE IS A PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF 
PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION OF SUBSTANTIVE LAWS IN MICHIGAN, THERE IS NO EXPLICIT OR 
IMPLIED LANGUAGE OF RETROACTIVITY IN THE STATUTE TO REBUT THE PRESUMPTION, AND 
THE ATTENDANT PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS REQUIRE PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION 
  
The Michigan Medical Marijuana Act does not apply retroactively to cases pending on 
direct appeal.107  It is a substantive law.108  In Michigan, substantive laws, without express or 
implied indications otherwise, are presumed to apply prospectively.109  The Michigan Medical 
Marijuana Act contains no express or implied indications of retroactivity.110  Regardless, 
retroactive application of the Michigan Medical Marijuana Act would be contrary to public 
policy.111  It would essentially condone illegal acts after their completion.112  It would further 
individual interests over societal interests and countermand respect for Michigan’s criminal 
statutes.113  Thus, in order to save prosecuting attorneys’ offices and other various state agencies 
time and money and in order to spare individual citizens from the uncertainty that follows from 
the passage of ambiguous criminal statutes, it would be in the best interests of the next state that 
legalizes marijuana for medicinal purposes and all other states that follow suit to provide an 
express statement of prospective or retrospective application in their legalizing statutes.114 
A. Substantive Laws Apply Prospectively unless the Statute Expressly of Impliedly Provides for 
Retroactive Application on Direct Appeal 
The Michigan Medical Marijuana Act creates a new substantive right: “The medical use 
of marijuana is allowed under state law to the extent that it is carried out in accordance with the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 See infra notes 115-42 and accompanying text.  
108 See infra notes 115-17 and accompanying text. 
109 See infra notes 119-20 and accompanying text. 
110 See infra notes 146-95 and accompanying text. 
111 See infra notes 196-250 and accompanying text. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 See infra notes 251-65 and accompanying text. 
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provisions of this act.”115  The act creates, defines, and regulates the rights and duties of 
parties.116  Where the retroactivity of a substantive statute is at issue, courts apply the rules of 
strict construction requiring clear, express indications of retroactivity.117  The question whether a 
statute operates retrospectively is one of legislative intent.118  The general rule in Michigan is 
that substantive statutes are applied prospectively unless the Legislature expressly or impliedly 
indicates its intention to give retroactive effect or unless the statute is remedial, procedural, or 
curative in nature.119  Considerations of fairness and public policy may also require retroactive 
application of a statute.120   
The remedial character of a statute may require retroactive application.121  A statute is 
remedial if it is designed to correct an existing oversight in the law or redress an existing 
grievance, or if it operates in furtherance of an existing remedy and does not create or destroy 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 M.C.L. § 333.26427(a) (2008).   
116 Frank W Lynch & Co v Flex Technologies, 463 Mich. 578, 585 (2001). 
117 Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204 (1988); Davis v. Michigan Cent. R. Co., 147 Mich. 479 (1907); 
In re Davis’ Estate, 330 Mich. 647 (1951); Hughes v. Judges’ Ret. Bd., 407 Mich. 75 (1979); Se. Michigan Transp. 
Authority v. Dep’t of Treasury, 122 Mich. App. 92 (1982); Davis v. State Employees’ Ret. Bd., 272 Mich. App. 151 
(2006); Christian v. Sanak, 179 Mich. App. 9 (1989); Thompson v. Merritt, 192 Mich. App. 412 (1991); Cheron, 
Inc. v. Don Jones, Inc., 244 Mich. App. 212 (2000); Mary v. Lewis, 399 Mich. 401 (1976); Brooks v. Mammo, 254 
Mich. App. 486 (2002). 
118 Hassett v. Welch, 303 U.S. 303 (1938); Kolster v. I.N.S., 101 F.3d 785 (1st Cir. 1996); Aka v. Jefferson Hosp. 
Ass’n, Inc., 344 Ark. 627 (2001); Andersen Consulting, LLP v. Gavin, 255 Conn. 498 (2001); Metro. Dade County 
v. Chase Federal Housing Corp., 737 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 1999). 
119 See Frank W Lynch & Co v Flex Technologies, 463 Mich. 578, 585 (2001); People v. Conyer, 281 Mich. App. 
526, 529 (2008) People v. Conyer, 281 Mich. App. 526, 529 (2008).  Conyers was convicted of assault with intent to 
do great bodily harm less than murder and possession of firearm during commission of felony.  Id. at 529.  On direct 
appeal, Conyers contended the self-defense statute applied retroactively to his conviction. Id.  The Court of Appeals 
held that the self-defense statute did not apply retroactively to shootings that occurred prior to enactment of statute 
noting that the substantive statute contained no express language of retroactivity and that the statute referenced an 
effective date. See id.; see also Judges’ Ret. Bd., 407 Mich. at 75, 85; City of Sour Lake v. Branch, 6 F.2d 355 
(C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1925); Flournoy v. State, 230 Cal. App. 2d 520 (3d Dist. 1964); City of Burbank v. Superior Court 
for Los Angeles County, 231 Cal. App. 2d 675 (2d Dist. 1965); Jackson v. State, 261 N.Y. 134 (1933); Bryant v. 
City of Blackfoot, 137 Idaho 307 (2002); Hyder v. Jones, 271 S.C. 85 (1978).  Statutes are also valid that provide 
new remedies and apply them to past transactions.  Pope v. U.S., 323 U.S. 1 (1944); Montana Power Co. v. Federal 
Power Commission, 445 F.2d 739 (D.C. Cir. 1970).  But, unless express language of retroactivity is provided and 
the statute relates to practice, procedure or remedies, statutes that affect substantive or vested rights are not 
presumed to apply retroactively. Hubbard v. Hibbard Brown & Co., 633 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993); Jennings v. 
Debussey, 1997 WL 295690 (Del. Fam. Ct.); Harding v. K.C. Wall Products, Inc., 250 Kan. 655 (1992); Langston v. 
Riffe, 359 Md. 396 (2000). 
120 See Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 478 (1993); People v. Houlihan, 474 Mich. 958 (2005). 
121 People v. Conyer, 281 Mich. App. 526, 529 (2008).  
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existing rights.122  The Michigan Supreme Court has “rejected the notion that a statute 
significantly affecting a party’s substantive rights should be applied retroactively because it can 
also be characterized in a sense as ‘remedial.’”123  The Court continued, “[t]he term ‘remedial’ in 
[the retroactivity] context should only be employed to describe legislation that does not affect 
substantive rights.”124  Thus, the Michigan Supreme Court will not give the substantive laws in 
the Michigan Medical Marijuana Act retroactive application under a remedial gloss.125 
A statute may require retroactive application if it can be characterized as procedural.126  
Procedural laws pertain to and prescribe the practice and procedure or the legal machinery by 
which the substantive law is determined or made effective.127  The Michigan Medical Marijuana 
Act contains procedural rules that permit medicinal marijuana usage by qualified patients.128  
The procedural provisions are given effect by the substantive provisions.129  Where newly 
created procedural provisions are given effect by a substantive statute, the Michigan Supreme 
Court held that the express intent of the Legislature gleaned from the language within the statute 
governs.130  Here, neither the Michigan Medical Marijuana Act nor the Michigan Medical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 Id. 
123 Frank W Lynch & Co. v Flex Technologies, 463 Mich. 578, 585 (2001). 
124 Id. 
125 Conyer, 281 Mich. App. at 529.   
126 People v. Russo, 439 Mich. 584 (1992); Hansen-Snyder Co. v. General Motors Corp., 371 Mich. 480 (1963); 
People v. Wesley, 2001 WL 1277480 *2-3 (2001).  
127 People v. Conyer, 281 Mich. App. 526, 529 (2008). 
128 See M.C.L. §§ 333.26427-8 (2008).  “If the department fails to adopt rules to implement this act within 120 days 
of the effective date of this act, a qualifying patient may commence an action in the circuit court for the county of 
Ingham to compel the department to perform the actions mandated pursuant to the provisions of this act.” M.C.L. § 
333.26429(a) (2008).  
129 See M.C.L. §§ 333.26425-26 (2008); Hughes Aircraft Co. v. U.S. ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939 (1997); Edwards 
v. Lateef, 558 A.2d 1144 (D.C. 1989); State v. Kelley, 588 So. 2d 595 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1991); Serfass v. 
Warner, 707 S.W.2d 448 (Mo. Ct. App. S.D. 1986); City of Madison v. Town of Madison, 127 Wis. 2d 96, (Ct. 
App. 1985); Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Mancusi, 632 So. 2d 1352 (Fla. 1994); Langston v. Riffe, 359 Md. 396 
(2000); Frank W. Lynch & Co. v. Flex Technologies, Inc., 463 Mich. 578 (2001). 
130 People v. Miller, 182 Mich. App. 482, 485 (1990); Lynch, 463 Mich. at 578. 
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Marijuana Program expressly or impliedly state that the substantive or procedural provisions 
apply retroactively.131   
A statute may be applied retroactively if it can be characterized as curative.132  The 
Michigan Medical Marijuana Act cannot be characterized as curative because the courts have 
consistently upheld the retroactive application of curative legislation which corrects defects 
subsequently discovered in a statute and which restores what Congress had always believed the 
law to be.” 133  The Michigan Medical Marijuana Act does not correct subsequently discovered 
defects.134  It is a substantive legalizing statute implemented by procedural rules that were 
adopted by the Michigan Department of Health.135  It is presumed to apply prospectively unless 
express or implied language of retroactivity is provided in the statute.136 
Considerations of fairness may require retroactive application of a substantive statute.137  
Michigan extends fairness and public policy considerations generally where a new principle of 
law is created either by overruling clear past precedent on which the parties have relied on or by 
deciding an issue of first impression where the result would have been unforeseeable to the 
parties.138  This test is generally employed in matters of equity and is inapplicable in the context 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 See M.C.L. §§ 333.26421-30 (2008); Lynch, 463 Mich. at 578, 583; People v. Russo, 439 Mich. 584, 594 (1992); 
Saylor v. Kingsley Area Emergency Ambulance Service, 238 Mich. App. 592, 598 (1999); see also About the 
MMMP, Department of Community Health Homepage, available at http://www.michigan.gov/mdch/0,1607,7-132-
27417_51869_52136---,00.html. 
132 See Lynch, 463 Mich. at 578, 585; see also People v. Conyer, 281 Mich. App. 526, 529 (2008). 
133 See People v. Link, 225 Mich. App. 211, 214-18 (1997); Preston v. Dep’t of Treasury, 190 Mich. App. 491, 495-
6 (1991). 
134 See M.C.L. §§ 333.26421-30 (2008).   
135 Id. 
136 Frank W Lynch & Co v Flex Technologies, 463 Mich. 578, 585 (2001); People v. Conyer, 281 Mich. App. 526, 
529 (2008). 
137 See Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 478 (1993); People v. Houlihan, 474 Mich. 958 (2005). 
138  Michigan Educ. Employees Mut. Ins. Co. v. Morris, 460 Mich. 180, 190 (1999).   Where the decision does 
reflect a new principle of law, the Michigan Supreme Court has acknowledged that resolution of the retrospective-
prospective issue ultimately turns on considerations of fairness and public policy, and has employed a three-part test 
to determine to what extent, if any, a decision should receive retroactive application.  Id.  Under this test, the Court 
weighs (1) the purpose to be served by the new rule, (2) the extent of reliance on the old rule, and (3) the effect of 
retroactivity on the administration of justice.  Id. at 190. 
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of criminal legalizing statutes.139  Considerations of fairness and accuracy of criminal 
proceedings are generally applicable to new watershed rules of criminal procedure to cases in 
habeas under Teague v. Lane.140  Direct appeals involving substantive legalizing statute do not 
implicate Teague v. Lane.141  The Michigan Supreme Court or the United States Supreme Court 
has yet to define the right to use marijuana for medical purposes as a constitutional right.142   
B. The Michigan Medical Marijuana Act Contains No Express or Implied Language of 
Retroactivity Rebutting the Presumption of Prospective Application 
The Michigan Supreme Court held that most suggestive of retroactivity is whether there 
are express words of retroactivity in the substantive statute.143  The Court further held that 
retroactivity may be implied where there are no penalties in the statute for failure to comply with 
the terms of the statute and where the statute contains no effective date.144  Judicial efficiency is 
also considered in determining retroactive or prospective application.145  
The Michigan Medical Marijuana Act contains no express words of retroactivity.146  The 
Michigan Supreme Court held that most suggestive of prospective application is the fact that the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139 This three-part test was first enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 
618, 629 (1965), a criminal case, and later utilized in a civil case, Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-107 
(1971). The Michigan Supreme Court first adopted this test in People v. Hampton, 384 Mich. 669, 674 (1971).  The 
United States Supreme Court abandoned the three-part test in Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 97 
(1993).  Now, Michigan generally employs the test in civil law contexts. Riley v. C & H Indus, 431 Mich. 632, 644-
645 (1988); Bryant v Oakpointe Villa Nursing Ctr. Inc, 471 Mich. 411, 432 (2004); Apsey v Memorial Hosp, 266 
Mich. App 666, 681 (2005). 
140 Teague v. Lane held that retroactivity is properly treated as a threshold question, for, once a new constitutional 
rule of criminal procedure is applied to the defendant in the case announcing the rule, evenhanded justice requires 
that it be applied retroactively to all who are similarly situated.  489 U.S. 288 (1989).  Thus, before deciding whether 
the fair cross section requirement should be extended to the petit jury, it should be determined whether such a rule 
would be applied retroactively to the case at issue. Id. 
141 Id. 
142 See id.; Frank W Lynch & Co v Flex Technologies, 463 Mich. 578, 585 (2001); People v. Conyer, 281 Mich. 
App. 526, 529 (2008); People v. Wright, 40 Cal. 4th 81, 91 (2006).  New federal substantive constitutional laws are 
generally applied retroactively to abate state laws that implicate them.  See Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 
306, 307-09 (1965).  But, issues arising when a state enactment intervened prior to the finalizing of state criminal 
convictions are for the state courts to pass on.  See Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964). 
143 See Lynch, 463 Mich. at 578, 580-86; Conyers, 281 Mich. App. 526-29. 
144 Id.  
145 See Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); Lynch, 463 Mich. 578-86; Parshay v. Dept. of Correction, 61 
Mich. App. 677 (1975). 
146 See id.; M.C.L. §§ 333.26420-30 (2008). 
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Legislature included no words of retroactivity.147  The Legislature has shown on several 
occasions that it knows how to make clear its intention that a statute apply retroactively.148  If 
retroactive application was intended, it could easily been stated via “this act shall be applied 
retroactively,”149 “this subsection shall be given retroactive application,”150 or “[t]he changes in 
liability that are provided for in the amendatory act that added this subsection shall be given 
retroactive application.151  Nowhere in the text of the statute are such express words of 
retroactivity found.152 
Proponents of retroactive application assert that the ballot language contains implied 
language of retroactivity.153  The Michigan Medical Marijuana Act is a product of initiative.154  
Even though initiative provisions are liberally construed to effectuate their purposes, they are 
subject to the same rules of statutory construction as statutes enacted by the Legislature.155  The 
ballot summary of the Michigan Medical Marijuana Act states that the purpose of the act was to 
“[p]ermit registered and unregistered patients and primary caregivers to assert medical reasons 
for using marijuana as a defense to any prosecution involving marijuana.”156  Proponents of 
retroactive application assert that the Michigan Constitution requires effectuation of the original 
intent of the ballot initiative to “permit registered and unregistered patients” to utilize the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147 See Lynch, 463 Mich. at 578, 583-84. 
148 M.C.L. § 141.1157 (2008). 
149 Id.  
150 M.C.L. § 324.21301(a)(2) (2008).  
151 M.C.L. § 324.21301(a) (2008). 
152 M.C.L. §§ 333.26420-30 (2008).   
153 See People v. Burke, 775 N.W.2d 800 (Mich. 2009); People v. Campbell, 778 N.W.2d 239 (Mich. 2010); People 
v. Malik, Barry County, COA Case NO 293397 (holding that the Michigan Medical Marijuana Act shall apply 
retroactively to pending criminal appeals).   
154 M.C.L. §§ 333.26420-30 (2008); Ballot Proposal 08-01, House Fiscal Agency Homepage, available at 
http://house.michigan.gov/hfa/PDFs/Medical%20Marijuana%20Ballot%20Proposal%20of%202008.pdf  (last 
visited March 31, 2010).   
155 CF National Pride at Work, Inc. v. Governor of Michigan, 481 Mich. 56, 67-68 (2008) (interpretation of voter-
approved constitutional amendment is “not dissimilar to any other exercise in judicial interpretation.”); Welch 
Foods, Inc. v. Attorney General, 213 Mich. App. 459, 461-62 (1995). 
156 See Ballot Proposal 08-01, supra note 154.  
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defense.157  They assert that the statute should be applied retroactively because possession of a 
registry card or a physician’s prescription is not a necessary requirement to utilizing the defense 
as per the ballot language.158  In this vein, all a defendant needs to show is that he or she has a 
debilitating medical condition and possessed marijuana for a medical purpose in order to assert 
an affirmative defense under the Michigan Medical Marijuana Act.159   
To support their argument, proponents assert that the broad language of the ballot was 
carried over into Section 8(a) of the Michigan Medical Marijuana Act: “Except as provided in 
section 7, a patient and a patient’s primary caregiver, if any, may assert the medical purpose for 
using marijuana as a defense to any prosecution involving marijuana....”160  Proponents of 
retroactive application assert that this language suggests that the defense is applicable in “any 
prosecution” regardless if the patient secured a registry card or otherwise complied with the 
substantive or procedural provisions of the statute.161  Section 8(a) does not mention “qualified 
patient.”162   
These arguments are without merit.163  Section 7 and the remaining provisions in Section 
8 narrow the scope of the act.164  The preeminent canon of statutory interpretation requires a 
“presum[ption] that [the] [L]egislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157 See Burke, 775 N.W.2d at 800-10; Campbell, 778 N.W.2d at 239-45; People v. Malik, Barry County, COA Case 
NO 293397.  Section 9 of the Michigan Constitution asserts: 
 
“No law initiated or adopted by the people shall be subject to the veto power of the governor, and no law 
adopted by the people at the polls under the initiative provisions of this section shall be amended or 
repealed, except by a vote of the electors unless otherwise provided in the initiative measure or by three-
fourths of the members elected to and serving in each house of the legislature.” MICH. CONST. art II, § 9 
(1963). 
158 See Burke, 775 N.W.2d at 810-12; Campbell, 778 N.W.2d at 239-250. 
159 See People v. Burke, 775 N.W.2d 800 (Mich. 2009). 
160 See M.C.L. § 333.26428(a) (2008); Frank W Lynch & Co v Flex Technologies, 463 Mich. 578, 585 (2001); 
People v. Conyer, 281 Mich. App. 526, 529 (2008). 
161 See id. 
162 See id. 
163 See Lynch, 463 Mich. at 578-85; Conyer, 281 Mich. App. at 526-29; People v. Burke, 775 N.W.2d 800 (Mich. 
2009); People v. Campbell, 778 N.W.2d 239 (Mich. 2010); People v. Malik, Barry County, COA Case NO 293397. 
164 See M.C.L. §§ 333.26427-8 (2008). 
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what it says….”165  Thus, an inquiry into the proper interpretation of a statute begins with the 
statutory text, and ends there if the text is unambiguous.166  It is a commonplace of statutory 
construction that the specific governs the general.167  
Section 7(a) asserts: “The medical use of marijuana is allowed under state law to the 
extent that it is carried out in accordance with the provisions of this act.”168  Furthermore, 
Section 7(b) defines circumstances to which the act does not apply.169  The broad language in the 
ballot summary and Section 8(a) conflicts with the narrow language of the statutory text in 
Section 7, which implements the statute.170  Specific language requiring a patient to satisfy 
Section 7, before he or she can utilize the defense, governs the general.171   
“[A]ccordance with the provisions of this act” under Section 7(a) requires “[a] qualifying 
patient [to have] been issued…a registry identification card….”172  Section 7 creates a rebuttable 
presumption that use or possession of marijuana was for a medical purpose if the patient was “in 
possession of a registry identification card…and [was] in possession of an amount of marijuana 
that does not exceed the amount allowed under this act.”173  Section 4 contains procedural and 
substantive requirements that must be complied with in order to secure a registry card.174  It is 
unlikely that the Legislature intended the act to be retroactive to a date prior to its effective date 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
165 Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992). 
166 Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N. A., 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000); Hughes Aircraft Co. v. 
Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 438 (1999); Conn. Nat’l Bank, 503 U.S. at 254. 
167 Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374 (1992). 
168 See M.C.L. 333.26427(a) (2008). 
169 See M.C.L. 333.26427(b) (2008). 
170 See Ballot Proposal 08-01, supra note 154; see also M.C.L. 333.26427-8 (2008). 
171 Morales, 504 U.S. at 374-98; Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 530 U.S. 1, 6; Hughes Aircraft Co., 525 U.S. at  
432, 438; Conn. Nat’l Bank, 503 U.S. at 253-54.  
172 M.C.L. § 333.2624(a) (2008).  
173 M.C.L. §§ 333.2624(d)(1)-(2) (2008).  
174 M.C.L. § 333.26424 (2008). 
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when the policies and procedures regarding identifying qualifying medical conditions and 
processing applications for registration cards were not even established.175   
If defendant secures a registry card, the burden shifts to the prosecution to establish that 
he or she failed to satisfy Section 8(a)(1)-(3).176 Section 8(a)(1)-(3) of the Michigan Medical 
Marijuana Act provides three elements: the procurement of a “physician statement…from a 
licensed physician[,]” the quantity of the marijuana must be “reasonably necessary” for 
treatment, and the conduct must have been “to treat or alleviate the patient’s serious or 
debilitating medical condition.”177  None of these elements can be satisfied by a defendant whose 
direct appeal is pending prior to the enactment of the Michigan Medical Marijuana Act because 
at that time physicians were prohibited from prescribing medical marijuana and marijuana use 
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177  
Except as provided in section 7, a patient and a patient's primary caregiver, if any, may assert 
the medical purpose for using marijuana as a defense to any prosecution involving marijuana, and this 
defense shall be presumed valid where the evidence shows that: 
(1) A physician has stated that, in the physician’s professional opinion, after having completed a 
full assessment of the patient’s medical history and current medical condition made in the course 
of a bona fide physician-patient relationship, the patient is likely to receive therapeutic or 
palliative benefit from the medical use of marijuana to treat or alleviate the patient’s serious or 
debilitating medical condition or symptoms of the patient’s serious or debilitating medical 
condition; 
(2) The patient and the patient’s primary caregiver, if any, were collectively in possession of a 
quantity of marijuana that was not more than was reasonably necessary to ensure the uninterrupted 
availability of marijuana for the purpose of treating or alleviating the patient’s serious or 
debilitating medical condition or symptoms of the patient’s serious or debilitating medical 
condition; and 
(3) The patient and the patient’s primary caregiver, if any, were engaged in the acquisition, 
possession, cultivation, manufacture, use, delivery, transfer, or transportation of marijuana or 
paraphernalia relating to the use of marijuana to treat or alleviate the patient’s serious or 
debilitating medical condition or symptoms of the patient’s serious or debilitating medical 
condition.  M.C.L. § 333.26428(a)(1)-(3) (2008). 
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and possession was prohibited.178  The only way a defendant seeking retroactive application of 
the Michigan Medical Marijuana Act could satisfy section 8(a)(1)-(3) would be by securing a 
prescription by a qualified physician after his or her arrest.179  California rejects medical 
approval after arrest.180   
Because the Michigan Medical Marijuana Act contains penalties for failure to comply 
with its terms, it provides further support that the statute must be prospectively applied.181  The 
Michigan Supreme Court held that legislative intent of prospective application of a substantive 
statute is gleaned where there is no express language of retroactivity in the statute and the statute 
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Code § 11362.5 (West Supp. 2003).  The California Appellate Court held that to allow self-medication in the context 
of the instant case would improperly promote non-medically supervised use of marijuana for a variety of 
subjectively held reasons that would frustrate the intent of the voters in enacting the statute. Rigo, 69 Cal. App. 4th 
at 409.  The State of Oregon followed suit in 2005. State v. Root, 202 Or. App. 491 (2005).  In State v. Root, Oregon 
Appellate Court affirmed a judgment convicting the defendant of the manufacture and possession of marijuana 
holding that the trial court properly barred the defendant from raising a “medical marijuana” affirmative defense 
under Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 475.319(1), inasmuch as he failed to prove that he had received a physician’s approval 
before the incident for which he was arrested. Root, 202 Or. App. at 491-98. 
181 See Frank W. Lynch & Co. v. Flex Technologies, Inc., 463 Mich. 578, 580-86 (2001); M.C.L. § 333.2627(a) 
(2008).  “Any registered qualifying patient or registered primary caregiver who sells marijuana to someone who is 
not allowed to use marijuana for medical purposes under this act shall have his or her registry identification card 
revoked and is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 2 years or a fine of not more than 
$2,000.00, or both, in addition to any other penalties for the distribution of marijuana.” M.C.L. § 333.2624(k) 
(2008).  “All other acts and parts of acts inconsistent with this act do not apply to the medical use of marijuana as 
provided for by this act.”   M.C.L. § 333.2627(e).  “If the department fails to adopt rules to implement this act within 
120 days of the effective date of this act, a qualifying patient may commence an action in the circuit court for the 
county of Ingham to compel the department to perform the actions mandated pursuant to the provisions of this act.”  
M.C.L. § 333.2629(a) (2008).  “If the department fails to issue a valid registry identification card in response to a 
valid application or renewal submitted pursuant to this act within 20 days of its submission, the registry 
identification card shall be deemed granted, and a copy of the registry identification application or renewal shall be 
deemed a valid registry identification card.”  M.C.L. § 333.2629(b) (2008).   
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provides for liability for “fail[ure] to comply with [its terms].”182  Because the Medical 
Marijuana Act did not exist at the time that the disputes arose, it would have been impossible for 
defendants to “comply” with its provisions in order to avoid criminal or civil liability.183  
Accordingly, this language supports a conclusion that the Legislature intended that the Michigan 
Medical Marijuana Act operate prospectively only.184   
Further support for prospective application is also found in the fact that the Michigan 
Medical Marijuana Act has an express effective date.185  In a footnote, the rules applicable to the 
Michigan Department of Community Health in the Michigan Medical Marijuana Act reference 
an effective date of December 4, 2008.186  There is nothing included in the act to indicate that it 
was intended to be effective sooner.187  Regardless of the fact that the effective date is not in the 
substantive text of the statute, the Constitution provides an effective date: “Any law submitted to 
the people by initiative…and approved by a majority of the votes cast thereon at any election 
shall take effect 10 days after the date of the official declaration of the vote.”188   
Judicial efficiency requires that the Michigan Medical Marijuana Act apply 
prospectively.189  The Michigan Medical Marijuana Act applies to more than just criminal 
charges.190 The affirmative defense in Sections 7 and 8(a)(1)-(3) apply to regulatory and 
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App. 526, 529 (2008); Chesapeake & Ohio Co. v. Public Service Comm., 382 Mich. 8, 22, 23 (1969).  
183 “The medical use of marijuana is allowed under state law to the extent that it is carried out in accordance with the 
provisions of this act.” See M.C.L. §§ 333.2627(a) (2008); see also M.C.L. §§ 333.2624(k) (2008); M.C.L. §§ 
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185 See Id.; M.C.L. §§ 333.26422-30 (2008). 
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189 See Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); Frank W. Lynch & Co. v. Flex Technologies, Inc., 463 Mich. 578, 
580-86 (2001); Parshay v. Dept. of Corr., 61 Mich. App. 677 (1975). 
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forfeiture actions.191  Is there to be a different retroactivity analysis depending on the nature of 
the action?192  The Michigan Court of Appeals, Division II recognized that such rules may not be 
retroactive if there was a prior law requiring forfeiture and the new rule would be overly 
burdensome on federal and state officials.193  Retroactive application of the Michigan Medical 
Marijuana Act would likewise hinder economic and judicial efficiency.194  It would foster 
uncertainty, especially with regard to those individuals whose appeals are pending.195   
C. Retroactive Application of the Michigan Medical Marijuana Act is Contrary to Public Policy 
Proponents of retroactive application would point to the social harm surrounding the 
offense.196  By proscribing that certain acts accompanied certain states of mind, a statute seeks to 
prevent either the occurrence of a harmful result or conduct that can predictably and 
unreasonably lead to a harmful result.197  When a criminal statute’s purpose is to prevent a 
harmful result, the crime is said to be a result crime; when its intent is to prevent potentially 
harmful conduct, the crime is said to be a conduct crime.198  In either case, the harm is referred to 
as “social harm” because the prohibited conduct is a public wrong that offends the common 
good.199  From this perspective, proponents of retroactive application assert that there is little 
social harm in retroactively applying a medical marijuana statute whose ultimate purpose is 
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furthering the common good (e.g., advancing medical application of the drug).200  They would 
further assert that there is no social harm in enforcing the statute against a few individuals who 
utilized the drug for their own medical benefit.201   
The previous argument is analogous to the civil disobedience defense where activists 
attempt to change legal or social conditions by deliberately and publicly violating the law.202  
Here, morality and legality are in direct conflict.203  Conditions where civil disobedience is 
utilized to bring about social or legal change include instances where the law is contrary to 
eternal law (i.e., natural law), applied only to the minority, not consented to by the minority, or 
unjustly applied.204  Proponents of retroactivity may assert that the violators are disobeying an 
unjustly applied law that restricts their access to a pain suppressant.205  Though it is unclear 
whether the defendants in medical marijuana cases are trying to make social statements or bring 
about social or legal change, what is clear is that these individuals determined that their 
circumstances warrant them to disregard established law in favor of furthering their own medical 
interests.206 
In order to dissect these arguments, it is necessary to define what crimes are and how 
they apply to society.207 Crimes are kinds of conduct that are defined by the law as wrong.208  
The criminal law purports to declare and enforce authoritative standards of value, in particular of 
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moral value.209  It claims the authority to tell us how we should live, and to enforce its demands 
on us if we disagree or disobey.210  Crimes can be further distinguished between public and 
private wrongs.211  A wrong or harm is “public” if and because it affects (i.e., wrongs or harms) 
“the public,” rather than only an individual victim.212  Criminal drug laws are generally 
considered public order crimes.213  Their proper purpose is to protect the “smooth functioning of 
society and the preservation of order.”214  What makes crimes wrongful in a way that properly 
concerns the criminal law is, on such accounts, not the wrongful harm that they do to their 
immediate individual victims, but their wider effects on social stability.215 
Proponents of retroactivity assert that the harm caused is not public because the 
consensus in society is to place an exemption from criminal laws, be it formalized through 
legislation or not, on the medicinal use of marijuana.216  Certain kinds of wrongful conduct are 
apt for criminalization because they involve serious unfairness towards one’s fellow citizens.217  
For example, someone who evades their taxes might cause no identifiable consequential harm, 
either to any individual or to the social institutions which are funded by taxation.218  If asked to 
explain the wrong she commits, the Prosecution would likely appeal to some version of “what if 
everyone did that?,” rather than trying to identify any consequential harm that she causes.219  The 
Prosecution would appeal, that is, to the unfair advantage that she takes over all those who pay 
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their taxes: she gains the benefits that accrue to all citizens from the taxation system, but refuses 
to make her appropriate contribution to that system.220   
This argument applies in the context of medical marijuana users who willfully violate 
criminal drug laws.221  The harm they cause society is indeed public because it thwarts the 
applicability and validity of criminal drug laws.222  These individuals procured marijuana 
through illegal means with the culpable state of mind to stand for conviction.223  They funded the 
criminal drug market, an illegal black market that deals in drugs and violence.224  These 
individuals are just as culpable as recreational users of the drug who could argue that they cause 
no harm to anyone but themselves.225   
Proponents’ reasoning could have far reaching and negative application.226  For example, 
is a patient suffering from the symptoms of aids, arthritis, glaucoma, or cancer permitted to rob a 
drug store in order to procure prescription drugs to alleviate his pain?227  This may be an extreme 
example, but it does show the apparent flaws in proponents’ arguments.228  Condoning illegality 
for the benefit of individual interest is a slippery slope, especially in the context of illegal 
drugs.229     
Justice Holmes recognized that public policy often sacrifices the individual to the general 
good.230  It is no doubt true that there are many cases in which the criminal could not have 
known that he was breaking the law, but to admit the excuse at all would be to encourage 
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ignorance.231  Justice to the individual is rightly outweighed by the larger interests on the other 
side of the scales.232  Thus, if ignorance of the law is no excuse, how can knowingly violating the 
law for the purpose of medical treatment be justified, especially considering the larger societal 
interests in strict application?233   
There are several approaches that pundits and legal theorist have furthered that may be 
applicable.234  The Public Benefit Theory asserts that legal wrongs can be justified on the basis 
that they benefited society generally, as opposed to the actor himself.235  But, in this context, it is 
the individual, not society who benefits from the violation (i.e., medical treatment).236  Society 
gains nothing except probably lack of reverence of its criminal code.237  Individuals who have 
broken the law and are now seeking retroactive application of their convictions were not likely 
trying to make political or social statements when they violated the law.238  Although, they may 
feel that the law needed to change, their ultimate goals were self-satisfying.239   
The Moral Forfeiture Theory holds that a crime is justified if it does not result in a 
socially undesirable outcome.240  This approach is based on the view that people possess certain 
moral rights or interests that society recognizes through its criminal laws (e.g., the right to life, 
etc.), which may be forfeited by the holder of the right through his misconduct.241  Criminal drug 
users who do not fulfill the statute’s procedural requirements are furthering illegality and 
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disregard for Michigan’s legal system and further a socially undesirable outcome.242  The 
Legislature had its reasons for providing a procedural threshold for the marijuana defense.243  
One such reason was to prevent haphazard or irresponsible use of the defense.244   The law may 
excuse a person from the consequences of an objectively illegal act only if the person does not 
deserve to be stigmatized and punished for performing it.245  Punishment in the absence of moral 
blame is morally objectionable.246  Surely, individuals who disregard established law in 
furthering their own interests are morally objectionable and deserve punishment.247  If they are 
not, what is the point of having such criminal statutes to begin with?  Why not let anyone with a 
debilitating medical condition have absolute immunity from any marijuana offense?248  The fact 
that there are regulations in place establishes that society decided to place limits on this 
defense.249  The legitimacy of the Michigan Medical Marijuana Act and Michigan’s criminal 
drug laws depend on strict compliance.250   
D. Suggestions for Future Medical Marijuana Legislation  
As a preamble, state statutes typically set forth the underlying purpose for allowing the 
medicinal use of marijuana as providing its citizens who suffer from debilitating medical 
conditions an alternative source of relief.251  This section broadly defines the goals and purposes 
behind the enactment of the statute.252  It provides recognition of the patients who have suffered 
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from the illegal status of marijuana.253  Because ballot initiatives are often overly broad, it is 
suggested that the preamble contain express language cabining the language of the ballot 
initiative.254  This section should serve the purpose of aiding in subsequent legislative or judicial 
interpretation.255  It should be unambiguous and every term used should be consistent and well 
planned.256  The California Compassionate Use of 1996 provides a great template.257   
In this vein, the preamble and a separate section within the substantive provisions of the 
statute should state that “this act shall be applied prospectively”258 or “this subsection shall be 
given prospective application.”259  Another effective approach would be to explain that “this 
defense is only applicable upon the attainment of a registry card and compliance with the use and 
possession restrictions of the Michigan Medical Marijuana Program.”260  Furthermore, “use or 
possession of marijuana prior to the date of the enactment of the Michigan Medical Marijuana 
Act, December 4, 2008, or not in compliance with the Michigan Medical Marijuana Act or the 
Michigan Medical Marijuana Program is not governed by the terms of the Michigan Medical 
Marijuana Act and the Michigan Medical Marijuana Program and shall be governed by the 
criminal drug laws and forfeiture provisions of the State of Michigan.”261  
An effective date in the substantive text of the statute is also preferred so that there is a 
point in time in which the statute may reference.262  An effective date can be simply stated: “this 
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act shall be applied prospectively as of December 4, 2008.”263  The state constitution may 
provide an effective date in some states.264  If this approach were taken, a direct reference to the 
state constitution as providing the effective date is suggested.265   
CONCLUSION 
The Michigan Medical Marijuana Act does not apply retroactively.266  It is a substantive 
law.267  California’s retroactive approach to new substantive laws is based on California’s legal 
tradition and case law.268  In Michigan, substantive laws, without express indications otherwise, 
are presumed to apply prospectively.269  Only procedural, remedial and curative laws are 
presumed to apply retroactively in Michigan.270  Retroactive statutes in Michigan have 
provisions asserting their retroactivity (e.g., “this act shall be applied retroactively”271  or “this 
subsection shall be given prospective application.”272) and generally contain no express effective 
date.273  The Michigan Medical Marijuana Act contains no express or implied indications of 
retroactivity suggesting that the Legislature did not intend to rebut the presumption that the 
statute applies prospectively.274  Although there is no express effective date, the Michigan 
Constitution and the footnote in the enforcement provision of the Michigan Medical Marijuana 
Act provide an effective date of December 4, 2008.275  The Michigan Medical Marijuana Act 
limits the defense upon satisfaction of the substantive and procedural provisions provided in 
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Sections 7 and 8.276  If defendants whose direct appeals were pending when the statute was 
enacted utilized this defense, he or she would require an after-the-fact diagnoses by a qualified 
physician to satisfy Sections 7 and 8.277  After-the-fact diagnoses are not permitted in California 
and in the other medical marijuana states.278  Retroactive application of the Michigan Medical 
Marijuana Act would be contrary to public policy.279  It would essentially condone illegal acts 
after their completion.280  It would further individual interests over societal interests and 
countermand respect for Michigan’s criminal statutes.281   
In order to save prosecuting attorneys’ offices and other various state agencies time and 
money and in order to spare individual citizens from the uncertainty that follows from the 
passage of ambiguous criminal statutes, it would be in the best interests of the next state that 
legalizes marijuana for medicinal purposes and all other states that follow suit to provide an 
express statement of prospective or retrospective application in their legalizing statutes.282  Some 
suggested qualifying language include: “this act shall be applied prospectively”283 or “this 
subsection shall be given prospective application.”284  Another effective approach would be to 
explain that “this defense is only applicable upon the attainment of a registry card and 
compliance with the use and possession restrictions of the Michigan Medical Marijuana 
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Program.”285  Furthermore, “use or possession of marijuana prior to the date of the enactment of 
the Medical Marijuana Act, December 4, 2008, or not in compliance with the Michigan Medical 
Marijuana Act or the Michigan Medical Marijuana Program is not governed by the terms of the 
Michigan Medical Marijuana Act and the Michigan Medical Marijuana Program and shall be 
governed by the criminal drug laws and forfeiture provisions of the State of Michigan.”286  
Adding these provisions will limit judicial interpretation and direct appeals.287  It will ensure 
proper application of the statute as per legislative intent.288  An effective date is also preferred so 
that there is a point in time in which the statute may reference for prospective application of the 
statute to take effect.289  An effective date can be simply stated: “this act shall be applied 
prospectively as of December 4, 2008.”290  If the Legislature intends to rely on its state 
constitution for an effective date, a direct reference in the statute to the state constitution as 
providing the effective date is suggested.291   
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